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Abstract 
Regulatory competition between the US and EU influences the development of the 
standards that define global ICT networks.  Traditional standard-setting organizations 
that once developed those standards have been marginalized by the rapid pace of 
innovation in ICT, and informal standard-setting organizations have rushed into the 
breach.  US policy favors informal standard-setting processes and often requires 
government interests to be subordinated to market outcomes, while EU policy favors 
formal standard-setting processes and often requires market outcomes to be 
subordinated to political mandates.   In the absence of a universally recognized, formal 
multilateral system to oversee the development of standards for global ICT networks, the 
market-oriented, decentralized approach taken by the US may continue to have more 
impact on future ICT standards than the EU approach.  However, a streamlined, 
reinvigorated version of the EU approach might be more effective than the US approach 
in promoting the public interest in interoperability against private interests in 
proprietary technologies and in reducing the risk of market fragmentation in global ICT 
networks.  Regulatory competition among all types of standards authorities is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future because multilateral efforts to harmonize standards 
law and policy will have difficulty succeeding in an environment where standards policy 
remains closely tied to national or regional cultural values. 
Introduction 
tandards define global information and communication technology (ICT) networks.  While those standards 
might once have been developed by formal standard-setting organizations (SSOs), in recent years, informal 
SSOs have taken the lead in setting those standards because traditional SSOs have had difficulty responding 
to the demand from ICT industries for prompt, focused results.  Traditional SSOs may be well adapted to meeting 
the needs of mature industries operating within stable markets, but their emphasis on transparent, inclusive 
processes and broad consensus has made it difficult for them to respond to the needs of dynamic new industries and 
economic sectors.  The success of the pragmatic, focused efforts of informal organizations such as consortia have 
permitted global ICT networks to continue to grow rapidly; however, this success has not translated into a universal 
recognition of their authority to set such standards.  Many question the legitimacy of the power exercised by 
informal organizations and would prefer instead to see revitalized organizations with clearly defined de jure 
authority over standard setting play a greater role. 
The US and EU are leaders in developing and implementing the standards that define global ICT networks.  
Global ICT standards are determined in part by regulatory competition between the US and EU:  US policy 
generally supports the work of informal, pragmatic organizations while EU policy is more oriented toward formal 
processes undertaken within recognized hierarchies of authority.  This paper will provide a brief overview of the 
differences in US and EU ICT standardization law and policy, and consider the contribution of each approach to the 
formation of the standards that define global ICT networks. 
Global ICT networks are complex organisms governed at multiple levels by different public and private 
institutions with overlapping jurisdictional claims, and a complete account of all those interactions and governance 
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper.  This paper will focus on selected aspects of global ICT network 
standards, and selected regulatory policies adopted by the US and EU to influence the development of those 
standards.  In particular, efforts to standardize selected “eBusiness” applications that are executed in ICT networks 
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will be used to illustrate similarities and differences between the US and EU approaches, and some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each. 
Regulatory Competition and Global ICT Network Standards 
The notion of regulatory competition was introduced in 1956 in Tiebout’s analysis of competition among 
different sovereigns to attract mobile resources such as labor and capital by offering different packages of tax and 
benefit structures (Tiebout 1956).  The notion of regulatory competition has now been applied to a wide range of 
economic sectors, and the range of regulatory tools used by governments to influence private economic decisions 
has increased.  As a result, the existence of multiple models of regulatory competition must now be recognized 
(Revesz 2001).  For example, regulatory competition among US states with regard to the regulation of depository 
institutions within a federal order may bear little resemblance to international regulatory competition among 
different national governments with regard to the protection of the environment.  This paper will apply the notion of 
international regulatory competition to ICT standards law and policy with particular reference to US and EU 
standards practices and organizations. 
ICT networks are impure public goods that were once located within national economies and provided by 
regulated or public monopolists.  Public goods, such as national defense or highways, are defined as goods for 
which consumption is non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  Unless some mechanism can be found to provide 
adequate compensation to the producers of public goods, their production may be inadequate to meet the demand 
for such goods.  A common mechanism for finding adequate financial support for the production of public goods is 
to have governments produce them and pay for them with tax revenues.  Impure public goods are those that are 
partly excludable and can become congested.  After decades of liberalization of telecommunications systems and 
the growth of newer, less regulated communications systems, the production of ICT networks is now largely 
controlled by private parties whose production of the network is paid for by end users in competitive markets.  
Production of impure public goods may be efficient if producers can charge non-producers for their use of the 
public goods (Demsetz 1970), which is the case with telecomm networks. 
The production decisions of service providers whose systems make up global ICT networks are 
coordinated through the use of technical standards; these standards in turn are also impure public goods (OTA 
1992). Standards developers once had well-established mechanisms for charging non-producers for access to 
standards, so the private production of public goods model worked well.  Some of these mechanisms appear to be 
breaking down:  free distribution of published standards undermines the revenue models of the SSOs, and claims for 
compensation for intellectual property rights (IPR) covered by standards may impede adoption of standards.  While 
a general consensus may have emerged on most issues concerning telecomm deregulation and the transfer of 
telecomm networks to private control within competitive markets, no similar consensus has yet emerged with regard 
to the manner in which ICT network standard-setting processes should operate or how they should be financed.  The 
intensity of the current debate surrounding the legitimacy and efficacy of various ICT standard-setting authorities 
reflects this lack of consensus concerning the governance and financing of ICT standard-developing processes.  
  The economic analysis of standards and competition among standard developers has generally focused 
competition among product vendors within markets, or on the possibility that a victory in a standards war might 
result in a redefinition of what constitutes a product market (Shapiro and Varian 1999).  The analysis is not quite the 
same with regard to the consequences of regulatory competition among standard-setting authorities in global arenas.  
Regulatory competition with regard to global ICT network standards is focused on the alignment of global network 
standards with local standards and the economic benefits that accrue to local businesses as a result.  A national 
government or regional authority competes successfully whenever it is able to project its local standards regulation 
into global ICT markets, displacing the standards regulations of its rivals.  Harmonizing local and global standards 
should provide a competitive advantage to local enterprises by lowering the cost for end users in global markets to 
adopt their products.  In addition, it may also permit a national government or regional authority to promote its 
policy objectives and disseminate elements of its legal culture in foreign jurisdictions.  Failure to compete 
successfully may result in the isolation of a national market from the global markets, which in turn may increase 
costs and reduce global market share for domestic producers. 
Regulatory competition exists because legal systems differ in the manner in which standards and SSOs are 
regulated.  Legal systems differ in the importance they attach to maintaining interoperability, minimizing the risk of 
fragmentation of the network, and accommodating innovation at the national or regional level within their standards 
laws and policies.  There is also considerable variety in the structure and function of standard-developing 
authorities.  Individual legal systems tend to be compatible with some forms of SSOs and incompatible with others, 
so while SSOs are normally non-governmental organizations, there is usually a close connection between a   3
particular approach to regulating standards and the type of standards authority that is most commonly encountered 
within a legal system that has adopted that approach. 
Regulatory competition over global ICT network standards takes place among a wide range of different 
types of standard-developing authority: 
•  Formal International:  the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), and International Organization for Standards (ISO) are formally recognized 
international SSOs with transparent, inclusive processes and broad consensus. 
•  Informal International:  the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) are informal international SSOs that do not have any formal legal mandate but as a practical matter 
may have tremendous impact on the development of global ICT network standards. 
•  Formal Regional:  the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization ( CENELEC) and European Telecommunication Standards Institute 
(ETSI) are formal international organizations established to serve Europe. 
•  Formal National:  the British Standards Institute (BSI), Association Française de Normalisation (AFNOR), 
German Institute for Standardization ( DIN), and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) are   
recognized by ISO, their national governments and local enterprises as having formal authority over certain 
aspects of national standards, but the scope and character of their authority vary considerably. 
•  Governmental: standards may be developed directly by governmental agencies such as National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST); the standards may be used exclusively within the public sector or may 
also be mandated for or adopted by the private sector. 
•  Voluntary:  market-based, demand-driven, private sector organizations with procedural safeguards working 
to achieve consensus.  The US has over 450 of these organizations (DOC 2005), whose operations may 
overlap and who may compete with each other for resources, while other countries may have none or nor 
more than a handful. 
•  Consortia:  Informal groups formed to develop a solution to a particular problem whose processes may lack 
transparency and whose membership may be limited; this category also includes alliances. 
•  Proprietary:  Market forces may cause a single proprietary technology to emerge as a de facto technical 
standard, in which case the owner of the technology may have exclusive authority over the development of 
the standard. 
The EU legal systems and the legal systems of member states are most compatible with formal international, 
regional and national standards authorities, while the US legal system is most compatible with informal 
international and voluntary standards authorities, consortia and proprietary standards.  It is therefore common to 
refer to voluntary SSOs such as ASTM International (formerly the American Society For Testing Materials) that 
were founded in the US and whose membership remains largely American as ‘American SSOs’ even though the 
ASTM has many members who are not American and its standards are used around the world. 
  Standards may vary depending on the form of authority that took the lead in developing them or policing 
their implementation.  Depending on the degree of market or government involvement in their development, they 
may be: 
•  De facto, market based standards.  The Microsoft Windows operating system is an example. 
•  Voluntary, consensus standards developed by formal or informal standards bodies.  Even though the 
sources of authority for ASTM and AFNOR may be very different, the actual work of developing 
voluntary, consensus standards through consultations with stakeholders may be very similar in each 
organization. 
•  Co-regulatory voluntary standards that provide a safe harbor to private parties that choose to adopt them.  
The New Approach is an example of co-regulation that requires standardization work in support of 
legislation to be undertaken by European standards organizations; such standards then provide regulatory 
safe harbors for parties whose products conform to them.   
•  Ex post regulatory mandates applied to voluntary, consensus standards.  National, state and local 
governments in the US may require conformity with a standard originally developed by a private SSO; 
outside the US, government regulators might work with the formal standards authority to develop a 
mandatory standard. 
•  Ex ante regulatory standards developed by government.  Section 508 standards issued by the US Access 
Board governing accessibility for disabled persons of electronic and information technology acquired by 
US agencies is an example.   4
The European notion of “co-regulation” is not generally recognized in the US, although the idea of “self-
regulation,” which is often considered as an attractive alternative to government regulation in the US, sometimes 
has similar characteristics.  The New Approach establishes a flexible framework within which legislators and formal 
SSOs can coordinate law reform and standards development efforts that is unlike any system currently recognized 
under US law.  The US system presumes that one or the other of two diametrically alternatives must be chosen—
private voluntary processes or mandatory public regulation—because no intermediate possibility such as co-
regulation is recognized. 
Most of the current array of different types of standards authorities and standards were developed before 
the growth of ICT networks, and it is unclear whether any of them can meet the unique challenges of ICT 
standardization.  The development of ICT standards requires rapid, focused processes; in addition, they must 
accommodate a two-tiered demand system:  both product developers and end users often have a direct interest in the 
development of the standards (Cargill 2001).  Unlike many industrial standards, end users are often aware of ICT 
standards and demand products based on their conformity with those standards, and producers encourage this by 
making conformity with a standard part of the “brand” of their products.  Although end users have more awareness 
of standards as essential attributes of ICT products and services than consumers of conventional goods and services, 
they lack the sophistication of the direct participants in the ICT standardization processes.  As a result, the two-
tiered structure of participation in ICT standards processes, in which end users can only play a limited role in 
monitoring the conduct of the direct participants or in reviewing the decisions of the standards organization, opens 
the door to opportunistic behavior on the part of producers if there are no other mechanisms to control such 
behavior. 
As with most standard-developing processes, producers of ICT products and services are the direct 
stakeholders and the interests of the end users are only indirectly represented in the process.  While the SSO is 
clearly an agent of the direct stakeholders, it is also an agent for its indirect principals, the end users.  The SSO, as a 
dual agent for two different principals, has obligations to both the direct stakeholders and end users that may be 
difficult to reconcile whenever there are conflicts of interest between its two agents.  Some observers of ICT 
standards processes have suggested that the direct participants in the SSOs have interests adverse to end users that 
are not adequately regulated by existing processes, which result in the development of standards that are not 
responsive to the needs of end users (Ketchell 2003, Cargill 2005).  Under ideal conditions, the interests of 
producers in the standard-developing processes should align with those of their customers the end users.  However, 
under real world conditions the interests of producers and consumers will not align to the extent that producers 
undermine or capture collective standard-developing efforts in order to promote proprietary solutions that permit 
them to increase prices to end users (Shapiro and Varian 1999).  
This paper will look at US and EU regulatory competition with regard to standards for two eBusiness 
functions that take place within the architecture of global ICT networks:  electronic contracting and data protection.  
With regard to electronic contracts, few businesses in either the EU or US use sophisticated technologies that would 
produce major efficiencies in their operations, notwithstanding decades of standard setting and law reform efforts.  
With regard to data privacy, law reform efforts in the EU have proceeded in the absence of standard-setting efforts, 
while in the US, a lax regulatory environment combined with private control over data processing and security 
standards has produced a tidal wave of identity theft that will be difficult to stem.  While the informal ICT standard-
setting efforts centered in the US have been decisive in shaping core ICT network standards, the EU proclivity for 
more formal standard setting coordinated with law reform may ultimately be more influential in contracting and 
data privacy arenas. 
Impact of US Law & Policy on Global ICT Network Standards 
In both the US and EU, regulators and private parties alike recognize the importance of developing 
standards on a voluntary, consensus basis in response to market demands.  What is distinctive about the US 
approach to standards is not that standards development is often led by the private sector, but rather the depth and 
breadth of private standard-setting efforts in the US, and the strict limits placed on the government role in those 
processes (DOC 2005).  Within the US, government intervention in standard setting is widely accepted as 
appropriate under the following circumstances: 
•  Protecting intellectual property owners’ rights; 
•  Policing the fairness of private standard-developing processes to prevent anti-competitive and deceptive 
practices; 
•  Making use of commercial standards whenever possible for procurement and curtailing the development of 
separate public procurement standards to the greatest extent possible;   5
•  Reinforcing market incentives by directing procurement budgets toward promising technologies; and 
•  Establishing regulatory mandates where necessary to protect the environment, health, or safety. 
Direct government intervention to coordinate the many private standard-setting efforts, to elevate a single private 
SSO to the level of an official national standards body, or to provide direct financial subsidies to selected private 
SSOs is not perceived as appropriate (OTA 1992).  This resistance to direct government involvement explains the 
anomalous status of ANSI, which represents the US in international standards arenas, but which does not enjoy the 
same status in the US as the other national standards bodies that participate in those arenas.  Within the US, ANSI is 
not generally recognized as having any greater authority than many equally large, successful, well-recognized 
private SSOs in the US.  When it reviews a standard submitted for designation as an ANSI standard, its review is 
limited to whether due process was observed in developing the standard.  Unlike the national standards bodies of 
other countries such as DIN in Germany, ANSI has no mandate to review the substance of proposed standards, and 
no authority to require inconsistent standards to be withdrawn as part of the process of recognizing a new standard. 
Unlike the EU, which early confronted the problem of technical barriers to trade and was thus forced to 
develop a regulatory mechanism for eliminating conflicts among national standards within EU member states, the 
modern industrial standards movement emerged in the US after integration of the national economy in the 19th 
century.  Because the federal government has the power to invalidate state efforts to obstruct interstate commerce, 
and because voluntary standard-developing organizations have no reason to develop standards for anything less than 
the national economy as a whole, the US has not been forced to develop regulatory mechanisms to harmonize 
divergent formal standards within the US.  Even though the US regularly faces the problem of overlapping or 
conflicting standards produced by competing private SSOs, no political consensus has yet emerged to support any 
major reform of the system. 
Given the absence of an industrial policy or other central government policy framework for imposing order 
on the efforts of private standard-setting efforts, it should hardly be surprising to find that the work of standard 
developing is undertaken in the US by ever more private organizations.  Given that responsiveness to market 
conditions is considered essential to successful standard developing in the US, it should hardly be surprising that 
just as government involvement in standards development is disfavored because businesses are presumed to be 
more in touch with market conditions than government, established American SSOs have found their authority 
challenged by consortia that claim to be even more responsive to market conditions than the traditional SSOs. 
The consortia standard-setting process is a characteristically and uniquely American contribution to the 
governance of ICT standards.  At the outset, allowing private consortia and alliances to take the lead in developing 
ICT standards permitted faster, more effective collaboration.  Private organizations contributed significant financial 
resources and invaluable human capital.  Although traditional SSOs might have been alarmed at the erosion of their 
authority, the ability of the consortia to deliver timely and valuable solutions to important problems made it difficult 
to argue that they should be encumbered with greater transparency and procedural safeguards or required to accept a 
broader range of stakeholders as participants. 
The very dynamism and informality of the consortia that were once the hallmarks of their success may be 
undermining their effectiveness and legitimacy, however.  With no mechanism to limit the number of consortia and 
alliances that can be formed, their number has proliferated, undermining the commitment of participants and the 
odds of success of each individual effort in terms of quality of deliverables and the effectiveness of their 
implementation.  As long as consortia deliver results that cannot be achieved through more traditional processes, 
questions about their procedures and authority can be deflected.  If consortia processes are not clearly more 
effective than traditional formal standard-developing processes, however, the sacrifice of established procedural 
safeguards for more informal, ad hoc procedures may no longer be justified. 
Since 1995, the US government has been required by the National Technology Transfer and Advancement 
Act to adopt private standards whenever possible.  This has had the effect of reducing the number of government 
standards being developed and has in effect turned the US government into the largest end user of products based on 
voluntary standards as well as the largest consumer of voluntary standards.  Many state and local governments have 
always depended on voluntary private standards because they lacked the resources to develop standards themselves.  
The growing dependence of the US government on voluntary standards developed by private SSOs has been called 
into question by a recent judicial opinion (Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. 293 F.3d 
791 (5th Cir. (en banc) 2002) which held that when a model code is enacted as legislation, it goes into the public 
domain).  The holding in Veeck has been very controversial in the US and it is unclear whether it will be widely 
followed by other courts; if it is, the US may find it has no alternative but to begin providing direct financial 
subsidies for the development of standards needed to implement regulations. 
The US penchant for letting the market lead has had a major impact on standards (or the lack thereof) for 
two important eBusiness applications:  electronic contracting and data protection.  While there has been little public   6
discussion of the relationship between technical standards and electronic contracting generally, there has been more 
than a decade of controversy and law reform efforts focused on electronic signature technologies and their 
relationship to contracting.  The controversy has surrounded the issue of whether law reform efforts should be 
technology neutral or should instead promote the use of a particular authentication technology:  digital signatures 
based on asymmetric cryptography and deployed within a public key infrastructure (PKI).  Although several 
American states passed digital signature laws in the mid-1990s, by 2000 when Congress enacted general electronic 
commerce enabling legislation, the tide had turned decisively in favor of technology neutral legislation (Winn and 
Witte 2000).  As a result, the “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act” (E-SIGN Act) does not 
provide any guidance with regard to what kind of technology contracting parties should use when forming contracts 
using electronic media.  This is consistent with the approach taken in the Clinton Administration’s “Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce” issued on July 1, 1997 which declared that the private sector should lead and where 
government involvement in the Internet was unavoidable, it should be kept to an absolute minimum.  The US tried 
without success to export this technology neutral, market-driven model of electronic commerce standards to the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic Signatures, but this was blocked 
by other national delegations who believed a more PKI-oriented, regulatory approach was needed. 
The US resistance to establishing regulatory mandates specifying the kind of online authentication 
technologies contracting parties should use was based on US experience as well as political culture.  By 2000, it was 
clear that US businesses were not using PKI technologies for online authentication of contracting parties; and it was 
difficult to predict when, if ever, this would change.  Businesses in the US have resisted adopting PKI technologies 
because they believe that PKI systems are expensive and difficult to use and even if implemented properly do not 
provide effective risk management tools.  In other words, US managers have been unable to identify a “value 
proposition” that would justify investing in PKI systems for electronic contracting.  As a result, electronic contracts 
in the US are formed using very rudimentary forms of authentication:  user ID and password logon systems. 
Managers with a knowledge of the rudiments of computer security understand the limitations of such one-factor 
authentication systems, but are unable to identify any stronger forms of authentication that are widely supported by 
vendors and service providers, or widely accepted by end users.  In the absence of any signs of an emerging market 
consensus with regard to stronger authentication technologies, individual businesses are refusing to invest in 
technologies that could easily be orphaned in the near future. 
 In February 2005, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a report documenting the gravity of 
the identity theft problem in the US and arguing that stronger online identification systems are an essential part of 
solving the problem (FDIC 2005).  The FDIC noted that use of one-factor ID by financial institutions is 
exacerbating the epidemic of identity theft now being suffered by US consumers.  It suggested that two-factor ID 
systems could dramatically improve the security of online authentication systems and offered to work with the 
private sector in identifying appropriate two-factor ID systems that might be suitable for wide-spread deployment in 
the US.  When the FDIC solicited feedback on its draft report from interested parties, it was attacked by many US 
businesses for officious intermeddling in matters better left to the private sector.  In June 2005, the FDIC announced 
it would not take any steps to assist in identifying technological solutions to the identity theft problem, although it 
refused to bow to demands to water down its analysis of the weakness of the systems currently in widespread use. 
US businesses and consumers currently appear to be trapped at a network inflection point and unable to 
move forward because no one is yet able to discern what standards will eventually emerge from the competition 
among individual stronger authentication products.  If the widespread resistance to making greater investments in 
online authentication systems indicates an absence of cost-effective, viable products in the market, any attempt by 
government regulators simply to require greater investment in currently available technologies would not be 
constructive.  On the other hand, if any one of the many technologies currently on the market could provide a cost-
effective means of quickly improving online authentication systems, and the only reason businesses are not 
investing in those technologies is a lack of coordination, then government intervention might be warranted to 
correct a market failure.  The analysis in the February 2005 FDIC report clearly suggests that markets for online 
authentication systems are failing in the US and that government intervention is long overdue, but the feedback the 
FDIC received just as clearly indicates that such intervention is not a politically viable option in the US today. 
The US has followed a similar path of letting the private sector lead in the data protection area, with even 
more dismal results.  The US, unlike the EU, has resisted pressures to enact laws that would create a general right of 
information privacy.  Personal information has become a commodity in the US in the absence of a regulatory 
framework that would impose restrictions on how it is handled.  The US has tried to put the data subject in control 
of how personal information is collected and used by promoting the use of privacy practice disclosures and giving 
data subjects the ability under certain circumstances to “opt out” of having personal information collected or re-
used.  This “notice and consent” alternative to strict controls on the collection and use of personal information is one   7
of many factors contributing to the current epidemic of identity theft in the US.  However, powerful business 
interests have been able to successfully block strong federal privacy legislation in the past and are likely to continue 
to do so in the future. 
Under appropriate circumstances, technological measures (privacy enhancing technologies or PET) might 
provide some protection for the privacy of personal information that could reinforce legal protections, or possibly 
even serve as a substitute for them.  The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is one example of a PET that was 
produced using the private, voluntary, consensus standard-developing process that is the hallmark of US standards 
policy.  Work began in the late 1990s on the P3P standard which would allow online sites to disclose their privacy 
practices and for end users to express their privacy preferences in machine readable formats.  The effort was led by 
the W3C, a non-governmental Internet standards organization located in the US that invites participation from 
individuals and organizations around the world.  Version 1.0 of the standard was issued in 2002 amid great fanfare 
and controversy.  By 2005, it had become apparent that the P3P standard was having impact on Internet information 
practices and has not yet been able to deliver on its promise to provide end users with more control over how their 
personal information is collected and used.  An analysis of the factors contributing to the apparent failure of the P3P 
standard may help illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of the of the US model of letting the private 
sector lead in ICT standard developing. 
The W3C is generally recognized as a highly effective global ICT SSO (FitzPatrick 2003).  In taking on 
the problem of developing standards for information privacy, it may have fallen prey to many of the problems that 
plague more formal standard-developing organization.  It ventured out of the relatively safe “pipes and wires” 
territory of narrow technical standards into the highly polarized territory of privacy rights.  While privacy advocates 
had high expectations with regard to the privacy enhancing functions the standard should enable, US industry 
participants expected that the collection and use of personal information should continue with little change if US 
consumers were willing to accept that.  Voluntary, consensus standard-setting processes are more likely to succeed 
when responding to market demand but in this context, the W3C was being asked to balance irreconcilable dignitary 
and commercial interests but had not been given any regulatory power to try to bring the stakeholders together by 
offering incentives or threatening sanctions.  Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the W3C 
produced a standard that has been widely criticized by privacy advocates as inadequate and a sell-out to industry, 
but that was largely ignored by industry as not being responsive to its needs.  Particularly telling in light of the P3P 
project’s aspirations to provide a global standard were the criticisms of the EU Commission’s Article 29 Working 
Party based on EU law. The Working Party pointed out that the P3P standard did not provide any means of dealing 
with essential issues under EU data protection law such as permitting an explicit opt-in to the collection of personal 
information when required by EU law or means to express the level of security around personal data (Hogben 
2003). 
Impact of EU Law & Policy on Global ICT Network Standards 
Within the EU, like the US, government intervention in standard setting is widely accepted as appropriate 
to protect intellectual property owners’ rights, and to police the fairness of private, voluntary standard-developing 
processes.  Unlike the US, EU member states may also work directly with recognized national standards bodies 
(NSBs) in order to implement industrial policies.  Although the NSBs of member states may work closely with the 
private stakeholders in those countries in developing voluntary standards in much the same way that ANSI does, 
they also have more coercive powers than does ANSI as a result of their authority to eliminate conflicts among 
national standards. EU NSBs participate in European standards organizations (European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (“ETSI”), European Committee for Standardization (“CEN”), and European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (“CENELEC”)), and are required to implement European standards and withdraw 
any conflicting standards.  This relationship is mirrored at the international level under the Vienna Agreement on 
Technical Cooperation, which establishes a framework for joint work undertaken CEN and ISO and which 
facilitates the adoption of ISO standards by CEN and vice versa. US observers believe that the close working 
relationship between CEN and ISO established under the Vienna Agreement has also made it easier for European 
standards to be adopted as ISO standards (Thomas 2000). 
EU regulators are well aware of the costs associated with excessive government intervention in the area of 
ICT standards, and have tried to reduce the degree of government involvement in order to gain some of the benefits 
associated with the consortia model of standards development (ICT Standards Board 2005).  ETSI, as the newest 
European standards body, can work directly with private sector stakeholders and has greater flexibility in its work 
processes than CEN or CENELEC.  While CEN was once limited to working with the EU NSBs, it is now 
permitted to work directly with private stakeholders to produce Workshop Agreements, a new form of deliverable.    8
CEN Workshop Agreements are intended to combine the flexibility and responsiveness of private consortia with the 
accountability and transparency of formal SSOs.  CEN Workshop Agreements are currently under development for 
eBusiness applications such as eInvoicing, eHealth and smart cards. 
The EU developed a form of co-regulation to coordinate law reform efforts with standard-developing 
efforts known as the “New Approach” to standardization.  Before the New Approach was originally adopted in 
1985, harmonization of technical standards in Europe was achieved by incorporating a specific technical standard in 
legislation, making them mandatory in the same way that many technical standards are incorporated into regulatory 
mandates in the US today.  After more than a decade of struggling with this process, it had become clear that not 
only was it a slow and difficult process for harmonizing standards, it also made it difficult to update the standard in 
light of new technology because the legislation embodied the standard itself.  The New Approach solved both the 
political and technological problems with the process:  once legislation has been prepared that requires an associated 
technical standard in order to be implemented effectively, then an associated European standardization effort is 
initiated by one of the EU standards bodies.  The Commission sends an observer to the standard-developing process 
but the process of developing the technical standard is otherwise unchanged.  The resulting standard establishes a 
“safe harbor” for regulated entities:  compliance with the standard is strictly voluntary, but proof of conformity with 
that standard creates a presumption of compliance with the corresponding law.  If the standard becomes out of date, 
it can be replaced by withdrawing the first standard and publishing a new standard in the official journal, but no 
changes need to be made in the text of the directive or by any member state implementing legislation.  This 
structured but flexible cooperation between the Commission and EU standards bodies is a type of co-regulation, 
which is defined as a form of governance that combines binding legislative and regulatory action with actions taken 
by the non-governmental actors most concerned, drawing on their practical expertise (EU Commission 2001). 
The New Approach has played an important role in creating a single market by removing technical barriers 
to cross-border trade within Europe, but it has proven difficult to adapt this framework to the special circumstances 
of ICT standard development.  This is in part because the New Approach process of developing standards in support 
of legislation is much slower and more politicized than the relatively streamlined, focused processes of private 
consortia.  Furthermore, the importance of standards and the effectiveness of the New Approach model of co-
regulation are not as widely recognized as they might be even in Europe.  The Data Protection Directive was 
developed by the Commission’s Internal Market DG, not by the Enterprise DG which has primary authority for 
industrial policy and standards policy, and so it was not classified as a New Approach directive because the 
connection between privacy law and standards was not recognized at the time it was drafted.  As a result, the 
Directive does not provide the Commission with a formal legislative mandate to work with an EU standards bodies 
to develop standards in support of information privacy.  The applicability of the New Approach model to data 
protection issues was recognized by the Commission in the 1990s, but attempts by DG Enterprise to work with 
private industry on a voluntary basis to develop standards for processing personal information were rebuffed at that 
time.  In the decade since the Data Protection Directive was enacted, little discernable progress has been made in 
Europe in developing and implementing standards for PETs, notwithstanding the strong protections provided by 
law.  This lacuna may be due in part to the failure to include harmonized technical standards within the scope of the 
Directive. 
By contrast, the need for interoperability and hence the relationship between standards and electronic 
signatures was recognized early in the process of drafting the Electronic Signature Directive.  The Electronic 
Signature Directive combines the technology neutral, general enabling provisions of the type found in the US E-
SIGN Act with the technology specific, PKI focused provisions found in the national digital signature laws of 
countries like German and Italy.  PKI authentication systems are described in the legislation as “advanced electronic 
signatures” and given a stronger form of legal recognition than less powerful authentication systems.  Although the 
Directive was initially conceived of as a New Approach directive, its structure was soon changed into a less 
demanding variation of the New Approach format, resulting in something like a “New Approach Lite” directive.  
The Electronic Signature Directive did not require the development of a formal European Standard, but instead 
points to “generally recognized standards for electronic signature products.”  This weaker requirement was chosen 
because it was recognized that the market for PKI technologies had not yet matured and so it would be premature to 
invoke the formal process of developing a European Standard.  The work of developing standards to meet this 
requirement was undertaken by the European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative, an ad hoc SSO 
established under the aegis of the ICT Standards Board, itself a joint venture of ETSI, CEN and CENELEC.  The 
standards development work was undertaken with financial support from the Commission and the contributions of  
both European and foreign stakeholders.  The work of EESSI was completed in 2003 and some of the EESSI 
deliverables were published in the Official Journal in much the same manner that European Standards for New 
Approach Directives are published.   9
In principle, the kind of sustained public/private cooperation found used to develop the EESSI standards 
combined with a clear legislative framework should now be encouraging the widespread deployment of strong 
authentication technologies in Europe.  But in 2005, the only large-scale implementations of PKI technologies in 
Europe were in the eGovernment realm, and there was no evidence they were being used by private parties to form 
contracts.  It is unclear what, if anything, this signifies.  It might be evidence of any of the following:  a) that not 
enough time has elapsed since the standards were finalized and the use of PKI technologies will soon increase as the 
EESSI standards achieve widespread acceptance; b) that the Electronic Signature Directive is flawed so it will never 
achieve its primary objective of promoting the use of strong authentication technologies for electronic contracting; 
c) that the EESSI standards are flawed so they do not meet the needs of contracting parties; or d) that PKI 
technologies are not suited for use in contracting applications, that businesses are aware of that, and that no amount 
of government encouragement through law reform or standard setting can change business perceptions that they 
would be a bad investment. 
Impact of Multilateral Governance of Global ICT Network Standards 
A fundamental challenge of ICT standards governance is managing the cycle of innovation and 
harmonization characteristic of technologies that produce strong network externalities (Allen 1992).  The US 
approach to standards governance is generally better suited to inducing innovation, while the EU approach is 
generally better suited to promoting harmonization.  At least at a theoretical level, multilateral harmonization of 
standards governance that incorporates the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their respective 
shortcomings would seem to be the ideal outcome.  In reality, however, such an outcome is unlikely in light of the 
ongoing disputes between the US and other countries regarding the “international” status of US private SSOs under 
the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (Thomas 2000).  The US believes that many of the hundreds of 
private SSOs established in the US should be considered international because they meet TBT criteria such as 
openness, transparency, and a consensus process for development, and the standards they produce are in use around 
the world.  Other countries, which have more powerful NSBs and fewer private standard-developing organizations, 
believe that true “international” standards bodies can only be made up of representatives of official NSBs and do not 
believe that private US organizations whose membership is open to public and private parties from any country 
meet the TBT criteria.  The dispute will be difficult to resolve because most observers in the US and most observers 
in the EU frame the issues in markedly different terms (Kahneman and Tversky 2000).  Historical and cultural 
factors contribute to widely held assumptions regarding the social costs associated with different legal and policy 
choices, and these assumptions in turn influence public perceptions of the legitimacy of different types of 
government and private sector conduct (Kagan 2003). 
In the US, government involvement in the market is widely perceived with suspicion, and the social costs 
of regulatory failure are widely presumed to be unacceptably high.  Even if a case of market failure can be 
established, government intervention is nevertheless still not appropriate unless it can be established that the costs of 
the intervention would not outweigh any anticipated benefits.  In the ICT arena, it is easy to observe the general US 
preference for deregulation and private initiative, and the commitment to fostering innovation than to managing the 
social impact.  For example, when asked whether the EU’s success with its GSM standard completely 
overshadowed the poor US experience of 2G mobile telephony, most will respond along these lines: “Yes, but 3G 
mobile telephony will be based on technologies that were developed in the US because EU policies like GSM stifle 
innovation.”  In other words, more than a decade of poor service and high prices due to fragmented 2G standards 
suffered by millions of subscribers is presumed to be a small price to pay for the US to remain at the technological 
cutting edge. 
In the EU, the unfettered operation of competitive markets is widely perceived with suspicion and the 
social costs of unregulated capitalism are widely presumed to be unacceptably high (Yamamura and Streeck).  A 
broad range of regulatory activity is perceived as necessary to insure the safe operation of markets.  With these 
framing assumptions, the social costs of regulatory failure are perceived to be small and remote, while the social 
costs of market failure are perceived to be large and immediate.  In 2000, the French director of a major European 
ISP explained how the European perspective on ICT differed from the US perspective:   “No, say the Europeans, the 
Net is not in the first instance a moneymaking thing. An online model that is solely generated at escalating 
shareholder value does not promote democratic values that benefit the community.” (Glenny 2001).  In other words, 
relatively strict regulation of some ICT products and services which may raise prices and restrict access for end 
users is presumed to be a small price to pay to insure that ICT markets serve traditional European social values 
rather than subverting them.   10
If it were somehow possible to bridge this gap in perceptions regarding the appropriate role of state and 
market in ICT standards policy, what multilateral institutional arrangements might make it possible to resolve some 
of the current concerns about ICT standards governance?  Some form of co-regulation in which the spheres of 
competence of public and private institutions are defined and where control over the process of developing and 
implementing standards passes from public to private at defined intervals might succeed.  Such a form of co-
regulation might consist of: 
•  A public gatekeeper that could confer legitimacy on a limited number of consortia, reducing the waste 
associated with competing consortia and increasing the level of commitment among participants to 
recognized consortia;  
•  Criteria for post hoc public review of consortia standards to determine whether the interests of end users 
and other non-participant stakeholders were adequately considered in lieu of ex ante requirements of 
formal openness and transparency at all steps in consortia processes;  
•  Guidelines for acceptable consortia IPR policies together with effective enforcement mechanisms to 
monitor the conduct of consortia members; and  
•  Public oversight of conformity assessments for completed standards together with effective enforcement 
mechanisms to monitor the conduct of consortia members. 
Such a system of co-regulation might preserve the speed and flexibility of standard developing by consortia while 
reducing incidence of opportunism among consortia participants and increasing the public accountability of the 
process.  Yet even if all those administrative objectives could be accomplished, it might not be enough if a system 
of co-regulation has no means of untying the Gordian knot of IPR claims asserted by non-participants or by 
participants if consensus on what constitutes RAND cannot easily be achieved (Lemley 2002). 
Conclusion 
Differences in US and EU standards law and policy emerged decades ago when national industrial 
economies were less closely tied to each other by international trade and communications.  They reflect different 
cultural values about the relative authority of state and market, and different assumptions about the form and scope 
of legitimate regulation.  The growth of global ICT networks has created a new arena for regulatory competition 
because the incorporation of a national or regional standard into global ICT networks represents a victory for the 
standards authority that produced it.  In the two examples of eBusiness applications considered in this paper—
electronic contracting and data protection—neither the US nor the EU approach have yet proven very effective, 
suggesting that further refinements may be needed in both regulatory models. 
Under the US approach to standard developing, the private sector is expected to take the lead in developing 
standards and the role of government is strictly limited.  Successful export of this model of regulating 
standardization efforts would tend to undermine the efforts of other governments to achieve broader regulatory 
goals such as industrial policies implemented through standards policy whenever global ICT networks follow US 
privately developed standards instead of technical standards tied to industrial policies.  Because the US approach is 
better suited to promoting private-sector innovation than it is to promoting the public interest in interoperability and 
preventing fragmentation of markets, dominance of the US model at the international level may make 
interoperability difficult to maintain as global ICT networks continue to expand. 
Under the EU approach to standard developing, government is expected to play a greater role, but the EU 
co-regulation model has not yet been adapted for use in the ICT standards arena.  If the EU can find a way to 
combine the benefits of informal standard-setting efforts such as speed and responsiveness to market conditions 
with the benefits of co-regulation such as interoperability and the coordination of social and economic policy with 
ICT innovation, then in the future, its impact on the content of global ICT standards may increase. 
References 
Allen, David (1992).  Telecommunications Policy Between Innovation and Standardization:  The Evolving 
Network, International Telecommunications Society, 9th International Conference, Sofia Antipolis, France. 
Cargill, Carl (2005). “Eating Our Seed Corn:  A Standards Parable For Our Time” available at 
islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/GlobalFlow/paper/Cargill.pdf. 
  --- (2001).  “The Informal Versus the Formal Standards Development Process:  Myth and Reality,” in 
Steven M. Spivak and F. Cecil Brenner, Standardization Essentials: Principles and Practice.  New York:  
Marcel Dekker, Inc., 257-265.   11
Demsetz, Harold, (1970). “The Private Production of Public Goods,” Journal of Law & Economics, University of 
Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 293-306. 
EU Commission (2001).  European Governance:  A White Paper COM(2001) 428 final available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf 
Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC)(2005).  Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft – Report 
and Supplement, available at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/alerts/theft.html 
FitzPatrick, Greg (2003).  The failure of European ICT standards policy -- and a possible future? Swedish ICT 
Commission Report 65/2003. 
Glenny, Misha (2001).  How Europe Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Future, Wired.com 9.02 Feb 2001 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.02/misha.html 
Hogben, Giles (2003).  Suggestions for long-term changes to P3P, available at http://www.w3.org/2003/p3p-
ws/pp/jrc.pdf. 
ICT Standards Board (2005).  Critical issues in ICT Standardization (27 April 2005 draft). 
Kagan, Robert (2003).  Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.  New York: Knopf. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (2000).  “Choices, Values and Frames,” in Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1-16. 
Ketchell, John (2003).  “eBusiness Standards—Re-Intermediating the End-Users,” J of IT Standards & 
Standardization Research, 1(2) 53-56. 
Lemley, Mark A. (2002). Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889. 
Peklmans, Jacques (2001).  The GSM standard:  explaining a success story.  Journal of European Public Policy 8:3 
Special Issue 432-453. 
Revesz, Richard (2001).  “Federalism and Regulation:  Some Generalizations,” in Daniel C. Esty and Damien 
Géradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration:  Comparative Perspectives.  New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 3-29. 
Shapiro, Carl and Hal Varian (1999).  Information Rules.  Cambridge:  Harvard Business School Press. 
Tiebout, Charles (1956).  “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”.  64 Journal of Political Economy 416-424. 
Thomas, James (2000).  “Plain Talk for a New Generation:  Time to Take Stock” available at 
http://www.astm.org/PRESIDENT/08_00_time_to_take_stock.html 
US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) (1992).  Global Standards:  Building Blocks for the Future.  
Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office. 
US Department of Commerce (DOC) (2004).  Standards and Competitiveness:  Coordinating for Results available 
at www.technology.gov/reports/NIST/2004/trade_barriers.pdf. 
Updegrove, Andrew (2002).  Is There a Need for Government Regulation of the Standard Setting Process, available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020418updegrove1.pdf. 
Winn, Jane K. (2001).  The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and Internet 
Commerce, 37 Idaho Law Review 353. 
 --and Robert A. Wittie.  (2000). Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal E-Sign Legislation 
   and the UETA, 56 Business Lawyer 293. 